A field experiment was performed in a controlled laboratory setting to evaluate whether credit officers reject micro-loan applications based on the ethnicity/gender of potential borrowers. Point estimates of a mixed-effects logistic regression suggest that, compared to non-indigenous men, non-indigenous women have two times more chance of loan approval, and indigenous women have 1.5 more chance of loan approval. The interval results regarding ethnic discrimination are inconclusive, however some evidence of taste-based discrimination in credit lending that was favorable for non-indigenous women was found.
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Despite the governmental efforts to reduce discrimination and eliminate barriers in the Bolivian credit market, there may still exist discriminatory practices limiting the access to financial services for women and ethnic groups in this country: according to the World Bank (2015) , in Bolivia, extreme poverty for people belonging to indigenous groups in rural areas is still twice that of non-indigenous people -51.6% compared to 22.5% -and 64% of the household heads in extremely poor households were indigenous, compared to 22% of non-poor household heads. Lundvall, Garriga, Bonfert, and Villegas-Otero (2015) add that women who belong to indigenous groups in Bolivia have lower education outcomes than any other group, thus creating a structural barrier for financial access. While gender is recorded when applying for a loan, there are no records of ethnicity in credit scoring (since this would be a discriminatory practice itself) and thus, it is not possible to use administrative information from financial institutions to assess the extent of discriminatory practices during loan provision. Nevertheless, a lab-field experiment can be performed to evaluate if ethnic/gender discrimination is a barrier limiting access to financial services for micro and small entrepreneurs of Bolivia.
This study presents the results of a laboratory-field experiment carried out to test the existence of loan discrimination in the credit markets of the cities of La Paz and El Alto in Bolivia.
To our knowledge, discrimination in credit markets of developing economies has not been analyzed by using an economic lab-field experiment before. In the experiment, similar credit files were delivered to 70 real credit officers from six micro-finance institutions (MFIs) in order to see if the outcomes -rejection or approval of the loan application -were different depending on the ethnicity/gender of the applicant. The results suggest that (i) non-indigenous women have twice the chance of obtaining credit compared to non-indigenous men, (ii) indigenous women have 1.5 more chance of obtaining credit compared to non-indigenous men, and (iii) there is no difference between indigenous and non-indigenous men in their chances of obtaining credit. While the evidence of favorable loan discrimination for women may seem counterintuitive to the general evidence of gender gaps in credit lending, it is in fact consistent with the micro credit model of lending: following the original model of Grameen Bank, female micro-credit borrowers were targeted by other micro-finance organizations like BancoSol and non-Governmental Organizations as ProMujer, both institutions currently working in Bolivia, where the experiment took place.
Two additional analyses with the data from the experiment were performed in an effort to (i) disentangle taste-based discrimination from statistical discrimination and (ii) clarify the inconclusive evidence from ethnic discrimination:
i.
At the end of the experiment, credit officers were asked to sort the credit files according to their preferences in loan disbursement for each client. This exercise was designed to reduce the motivation for statistical discrimination, since the participants had access and time to evaluate the complete information of the potential borrower, and thus any remaining discrimination in the sorting of files should only be related to taste-based discrimination. Higher probabilities of preference in loan disbursement were observed for non-indigenous women when compared to indigenous men and to a lesser extent when compared to non-indigenous men and indigenous women. This result could be interpreted as evidence of taste-based discrimination in credit lending which favors nonindigenous women.
ii. During 2016, consultations were held with the president of the Central Bank of Bolivia, Altonji & Blank (1999) define discrimination in credit lending as a situation in which potential borrowers who can meet their debt obligations in the same way are treated unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as ethnicity or gender. 'Unequally' implies that potential borrowers face different credit-rejection rates or receive different credit amounts, despite having similar characteristics. This study presents the results of a laboratoryfield experiment carried out to test the existence of loan discrimination in the credit markets of the cities of La Paz and El Alto in Bolivia. The study contributes to the literature regarding controlled experiments since, to our knowledge, discrimination in credit markets of developing economies has never been analyzed by means of an economic lab-field experiment before.
I. Introduction
In Bolivia, despite the efforts to reduce discrimination and eliminate barriers in the credit market 1 , discriminatory practices limiting the access to financial services for women and ethnic groups may still exist: according to World Bank (2015) , in Bolivia, extreme poverty for people belonging to indigenous groups in rural areas is still twice that of non-indigenous people-51.6% compared to 22.5%-and 64% of the household heads in extreme poor households were indigenous, compared to 22% of the non-poor household heads. Lundvall et al. (2015) add that women who belong to indigenous groups in Bolivia have lower education outcomes than any other group. For example, the literacy rate for indigenous women is 15 percentage points lower compared to non-indigenous men, creating a structural barrier for financial access. Gender and ethnicity are thus relevant issues to focus on when analyzing financial inclusion, since both could be a source of discrimination in credit access. While gender is recorded when applying for a loan, there are no records of ethnicity in credit scoring (since this would be a discriminatory practice itself) and thus it is not possible to use administrative information from financial institutions to assess the extent of discriminatory practices during loan provision. Nevertheless, a lab-field experiment can be performed to evaluate if ethnic/gender discrimination is a barrier 1 Recently, the Bolivian government issued a law against racism and all forms of discrimination promulgated by President Evo Morales as Law 737 on 10th October, 2010. The New Financial Services Law of Bolivia was also introduced in August 2013. In terms of credit access, the New Financial Services Law sets limits on interest rates and the criteria of portfolio allocation for productive activities, and highlights in article 74 that the access of financial services must be on a basis of equal treatment, without discrimination by gender, race or cultural identity. Heng (2015) made an evaluation of the impact of the New Financial Services Law in Bolivia and he found that the interest rate caps had an effect on financial inclusion, especially for small borrowers, as microfinance institutions had increased loan sizes and reduced the number of borrowers. 
II. Literature Review
Two main competitive theoretical models of discrimination exist: taste based discrimination (henceforth, TBD) and statistical discrimination (SD). TBD was originally proposed by Becker (2010) as an intrinsic unpleasantness against members of a group, which results from ignorance or prejudices attached to ethnic and/or gender characteristics. Becker (2010) showed, theoretically, that taste-based discrimination -because of race, religion, sex, color, social class, personality, or other non-pecuniary considerations-results in a misallocation of resources, ultimately reducing real incomes in the market, particularly those of the minority who experience the discrimination. Extensions of TBD for credit markets can be found in Dymski (1995) and Han (2004) . Statistical discrimination is based on the work of Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) .
Theoretically, SD is a result of incomplete information: when there is a need to make choices under uncertainty, decision-makers appeal to prior information about the qualities of a group based on (i) sociological beliefs, or (ii) previous statistical experience about the default rates of the minority group. The discriminatory decision can be considered rational -in the maximizingexpected-utility sense-if the cost of acquiring information is sufficiently high. In this case, credit officers will draw upon easily observable characteristics of a group -like gender and ethnicityas a proxy for the payment capacity of the potential borrower if these characteristics are correlated with the performance of the borrowers. Furthermore, loan approval choices will be affected even if the credit officer does not have an intrinsic (taste-based) prejudice against the minority group. See inter alia Scalera and Zazzaro (2001) .
Field experiments on discrimination tend to be focused on correspondence studies for labor markets in developed economies-see Rich (2014) and Bertrand and Duflo (2016) for a survey. Dymski (2006) provides an overview of previous empirical studies of discrimination in the credit market, based on racial redlining, mortgage loan data and audit (in-person) studies.
Studies based on observational data, such as Deku and Kara (2013) , found evidence that households of a racial origin other than white were more likely to be excluded from consumer credit in the UK, while Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) found that black-owned small businesses were almost three times more likely to have a loan application denied in the U.S.
small business credit market. However, Nwosu, Orji, Nnetu and Nwangwu (2015) , using observational data from a developing country, did not find significant discrimination against women entrepreneurs in the formal credit markets of Nigeria, after analyzing the enterprise survey data of this country from 2010. Other studies, such as Pope and Sydnor (2011) , found that in peer-to-peer credit markets (prosper.com) loan listings with blacks in the attached picture were 25% to 35% less likely to receive funding than those of whites with similar credit profiles; using also photographs of potential borrowers from prosper.com, Duarte, Siegel and Young (2012) further showed that borrowers who appeared more trustworthy had higher probabilities of having their loans funded, a finding which is consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending.
In terms of audit studies, Turner, Freiberg, Godfrey, Herbig, Levy and Smith (2002) matched Hispanic and African-American testers with white testers, who had roughly equivalent financial backgrounds, to evaluate discriminatory treatment when they inquired about loan products. Their results showed that most people of color did not face discriminatory treatment when they inquired about loan products, but in contrast African-American and Hispanic homebuyers faced a statistically significant risk of receiving less favorable treatment than whites did when they asked mortgage-lending institutions about financing options. Fay and Williams (1993) used an experimental design based on sending a loan application (with a photo of a male or female applicant) to a random sample of loan officers in 200 bank branches of four major trading banks in towns and cities in New Zealand. They found that there was a significant difference in the probability of being granted a loan in favor of the male applicant if the university qualification was absent. In a recent study, Harkness (2016) used Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk workers to evaluate a series of loan applicants whose gender (female or male) and race (black or white) were manipulated. Results showed that black men and white women were more disadvantaged relative to black women and white men in their experimental credit market.
Cross-country studies have found that women are less likely to use credit (Demirgüç-Kunt,
Klapper & Singer, 2013), female-managed firms are less likely to obtain a bank loan compared with male-managed counterparts (Muravyev, Talavera & Schäfer, 2009) , and that female-owned firms have a lower probability of access to credit (Calcagnini, Giombini & Lenti, 2015) . Mixedevidence of this gender gap was found for Latin American countries: Bruhn (2009) did not find systematic evidence of gender discrimination, while Piras, Presbitero and Rabellotti (2013) found that women-led businesses were more likely to be financially constrained than other comparable firms, with a gender gap driven by taste-based discrimination, and Agier and Szafarz (2013) did not find a gender bias in loan denial in Brazil, but rather a gender gap in loan size. The preference of the micro-credit model for women was explained by Mayoux (2000) through three paradigms: (i) financial self-sustainability, (ii) poverty alleviation, and (iii) women's empowerment.
The first paradigm targets women because of efficiency considerations; that is, high female repayment rates and the contribution of women's economic activity to economic growth. The second paradigm targets women because of higher levels of female poverty and women's responsibility for household well-being. Finally, if micro-finance is conceived as an entry point for women's economic, social and political empowerment, women are targeted due to gender equality and human rights considerations. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) added that microfinance is focused on self-employed small businesses in the informal sector, typically controlled by women, and Aggarwal, Goodell and Selleck (2015) further argued that microfinance institutions will focus on women in an environment of lower social trust.
III. Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to evaluate whether real credit officers reject micro-loan applications based on the ethnicity/gender of potential borrowers. The experiment can be seen as a laboratory experiment because the treatment was controlled by the researchers, but can also be classified as a field experiment since the outcomes -rejection or approval of the loan application -were generated by real credit officers (see Levitt & List, 2009 ).
Recruitment of participants. Meetings with the executive directors of 6 MFIs of Bolivia
were held to recruit credit officers for the experiment. Following the instructions of the research team, each MFI sorted its list of credit officers working in the cities of La Paz and El Alto in alphabetical order and then provided the names and contact information of the first 10 and the last 10 credit analysts from the list. These cities were chosen because both are highly populated by credit officers who were close to the site where the experiment took place 2 . The contact with every credit officer was performed by phone calls and through e-mails attached with an invitation letter. Eighty-six credit officers accepted the invitation to participate in the experiment.
Pilot study. A pilot study was conducted in November 2015, before the official experiment, to identify flaws in the experimental design. The main result of the pilot study was that credit officers translated the information of a potential borrower into a final discrete choice (rejection or approval of a loan application) rather than in a continuous probability of loan default, as they correctly approved credit files with good financial indicators. However, when they were asked about allocating a (continuous) probability of default to the same files, they wrongly choose high probabilities for approved files, which is a counterintuitive appreciation of the concept of default probability. Thus, a dichotomic variable (rejection or approval of a loan application) was chosen as the outcome of the experiment. Experimental procedures. In the first step of the experiment credit officers completed a registration form to obtain demographic information about the participants. Afterwards, a team researcher explained the purpose of the activity to the participants, the payment they would receive and the procedure. Four application files were then delivered to each of the participants.
Once all of the participants had received their files, they were required to state the order in which they wanted to evaluate their four applications. They had two minutes to decide this order, which was timed using a stopwatch. Then, participants were asked to evaluate each loan application and answer questions on a loan evaluation sheet (see Appendix A). After one hour of studying their files, participants were interrupted and they were asked to order the files again, this time in relation to the loan release order they preferred, if any. In the last step of the experiment the research team validated the participants' evaluations to avoid missing values. The ordering of the activities of the experiment were aimed at disentangling taste-based discrimination from statistical discrimination.
Experimental instructions. The explanation highlighted that all of the information in the loan application files was real and corroborated and verified by the research team. Participants that evaluated loan applications were informed that the experiment was focused on improving the understanding about the process of credit evaluation in MFIs. In order to avoid biased attitudes caused by a Hawthorne effect, participants did not know the real purpose of the experiment (discriminatory behavior in credit lending).
Credit application files. Credit applications of four potential borrowers were delivered to the credit officers for evaluation: a loan application from an indigenous-male, a loan application from a non-indigenous-male, a loan application from an indigenous-female and a loan application from a non-indigenous-female. The information in the folders was fictitious but it was based on real and representative credit profiles. Eight category of information was introduced in the loan folders to support the payment capacity of the potential borrower: (i) personal data of the applicant, (ii) household information, (iii) general information of the economic activity, (iv) information about the credit requested, (v) information about the guarantor and the couple (spouse or cohabiting partner) of the applicant, (vi) historical credit reports and assets of the applicant, (vii) detailed economic information of the activity and (viii) proposed payment plan of the loan. Table 1 shows that the information of the four credit files provided to the credit officers was similar but not identical. To further ensure that the information was balanced between application files and to isolate its effect on the experiment, indigenous and non-indigenous names and surnames and the pictures (the treatment) were swapped between files for each category of information I, II, III, IV, both for men (I, II) and women (III, IV). Treatment design. Pictures and indigenous-sounding names of the potential borrower were used as the 'treatment' of the experiment. The pictures were chosen considering the skin color, face shape (slanted eyes and prominent cheekbones) and age ranges (30 to 45 years old) typical of potential borrowers from the indigenous Aymara nation, an ethnic group of the Andes and Altiplano regions of South America . The pictures used in the experiment are available upon request.
Candidate names were selected based on the most frequent names from the official list of voters elaborated by the Organismo Electoral Plurinacional (Electoral Organism of Bolivia). In order to decide which names were indigenous and which were not, an online survey applied to a non-probabilistic sample of 29 credit officers in the city of La Paz was conducted in October 2015. Each person was asked to connect some features of a person with a particular picture (with and without indigenous appearance) and then they were requested to match the picture with possible names. The results of the survey allowed to clearly identify some names as indigenous and non-indigenous and four of these names and surnames were used in the experiment (see Table 2 ). A similar approach was used by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) to evaluate ethnic discrimination in the labor market of Chicago and Boston. Table 3 shows that of the 70 participants in the experiment, 43 approved the loan application for indigenous men, 40 for non-indigenous men, 64 for indigenous women and 64 for non-indigenous women. Table 4 shows detailed descriptive statistics of the data collected with the evaluation sheet of the experiment. The frequencies are displayed according to the gender/ethnicity of the application folder. 
IV. Data analysis methods
A logistic mixed-effects model was used to analyze the data of the experiment. Ross 3 McNeish (2016) further showed that researchers do not need to have extensive prior information to obtain useful Bayesian MCMC estimates in small samples, if the prior is set in the vague vicinity of the population value, even with a fairly large variance. In a study of the analysis of small sample of multilevel data with a complex variance structure, Baldwin and Fellingham (2013) also favor the Bayesian estimator with a carefully chosen prior hyperparameters over adjusted restricted maximum likelihood, as the Bayesian approach does the best job balancing bias and efficiency.
A Bayesian logistic mixed-effects model has the form:
In this model, index ℎ indicates group level, $ is the number of observations in group ℎ, and $ is the total number of groups. See inter alia Gilks, Wang, Yvonnet and Coursaget (1993), Holmes and Held (2006) , Karabatsos (2015) and Masuda and Stone (2015) . In the case of the experiment, = 1 ( = 0) if the loan application was accepted (rejected) by the credit officer, ℎ = 1,2, … , $ for the $ = 70 credit officers that participated in the experiment and $ = 4 since four files were delivered for evaluation to each participant. Precision hyper-parameters 2 3 = 5 = 5 = 6 = .1 around a zero-mean were chosen assuming that no discrimination exists a priori. The vector includes information about the gender of the applicant, the treatment (being indigenous), and the interaction effects among the ethnicity and the gender of the loan applicant, using non-indigenous men as the baseline for comparison. Control covariates were also included in to account for the characteristics of the participants, the credit profile of the potential borrower, and the financial evaluation of the credit application performed by the credit officers. The inclusion of covariates when analyzing the outcome of an experiment was suggested by Glennerster and Takavarasha (2013) to reduce unexplained variance; as the control variables were highly correlated, they were summarized into synthetic covariates in order to account for (i) the characteristics of the participants, (ii) the credit profile of the potential borrower, and (iii) the financial evaluation of the credit application performed by the credit officers. The covariates were summarized into these synthetic covariates using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) when the data was nominal or ordinal, and with principal components (PCA) when the data was continuous (Table 5) . See Francois Husson (2010) for details regarding these techniques.
A hybrid Metropolis-Hastings and Gibbs sampling algorithm was used to estimate the Bayesian mixed-effects model, using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with 32498 iterations, a thin parameter equal to 3, and a burn-in of 2500 samples. Point estimates of : were obtained minimizing the expected loss of a squared-error function; that is, the Bayesian point estimators are the mean of the posterior distribution of : (see Gill, 2014) . Odds ratios calculated with
-where is the Napier's (Euler's) constant-were used to measure the association between the exposure and the outcome of the experiment, due to its convenient interpretation: if 2 3 = 1, there will be no relationship between loan approval and the ethnicity/gender of the potential borrower, but if 2 3 > 1 ( 2 3 < 1) the exposure will be associated with higher (lower) odds of loan approval (see Bland & Altman, 2000 and Szumilas, 2010) . 
V. Results
Frequentist Analysis. Bayesian Analysis. Table 7 and Figures 3 and 4 show the results of estimating the mixedeffects model with Bayesian methods. Good convergence and mixing of the MCMC chains were observed in the runs: the trajectory of the chains was stable over time in the trace plots (see Figures 3 & 4) , the efficiency rates of the parameters were above 15%, and the Geweke's convergence diagnostic (Geweke, 1991) suggests that the chains were stationary (see Table 7 ). The results of the Bayesian estimation suggest that the combined gender and ethnic characteristics of a borrower were important for credit approval with a 95% probability. Point estimates of the odds ratios-conditional on the data and the assumptions of the experimentsuggest that non-indigenous women have twice the chance of obtaining credit compared to nonindigenous men. In turn, indigenous women have 1.5 more chance of obtaining credit compared to non-indigenous men. Furthermore, for indigenous and non-indigenous men, no differences were observed in their chances of obtaining credit: the 95% credible interval for the interaction effect of indigenous men was between .64 and 1.71. Figure 3 shows the interaction of the parameters of gender and ethnicity: even if both variables equally affect the chances of receiving a loan, the uppermost effect was caused by gender-specifically by being a woman. Figure 4 shows that the odds ratio density for indigenous women 2 3 crossed zero with a 95% probability rate, but it was between 1 and 2.48 with a 90% probability. An overlapping region between ?@ 2 3 and the odds density of non-indigenous women A?@ 2 3 was observed. A nonparametric estimation of this overlapping region (Schmid & Schmidt, 2006) , The sensitivity of the Bayesian analysis to different values of prior hyper-parameters was also investigated. Let ℵ ∈ ℝ be the reciprocal of the variance of a parameter. In the study, a value of ℵ = .1 around a zero-mean was used for the precision hyper-parameters 2 3 , 5 , 5 , 6 during the Bayesian estimation. Table 8 shows that when more variance (uncertainty) is allocated around the zero-mean betas (i.e. when ℵ = .01) the effect of gender lessens but women still have higher chances of loan approval compared to men. In contrast, when ℵ = 1 (when less uncertainty is placed in the zero-mean priors), women continue to have higher chances of loan approval compared to men, but the effect of gender increases and the gap of loan approval widens between indigenous and non-indigenous women. This last result suggests that stronger a priori beliefs about discrimination in the Bolivian credit markets can be used to unravel the evidence about ethnic/gender gaps in loan approval. Qualitative research in the form of the consultation of experts was thus conducted to complement the mixed-effects logistic estimation: interviews were held with the president of the Central Bank of Bolivia, the ex-Director of the Regulatory Authority of the Financial System in Bolivia, and the General Manager of CRECER, which is a development finance institution focused on providing micro-credit and educational services to low-income women. All of the interviewed experts had more than 20 years of experience working in the microfinance sector of Bolivia. The interviews collected the perception of the respondents about (i) lending subjectivity, (ii) ethnic discrimination and (iii) gender discrimination:
1. The three experts agreed that a degree of subjectivity exists when granting a loan because credit officers develop an intuition about the potential borrower, which plays a role when accepting or rejecting a loan, and also because sometimes there may be more empathy between the loan officer and the client, if the social group of the loan officer resembles that of the applicant.
2. For one of the respondents, being indigenous moderately restricts access to credit due to language and idiosyncratic barriers, while for another respondent ethnic discrimination could act in reverse (i.e. in a favorable sense) as people in rural areas/indigenous people are considered more reliable due to the value of their word and honesty being much more important than in urban areas. The remaining respondent established that he had not seen significant differences of micro-credit allocation in localities where the population was predominantly indigenous (Aymara or Quechua).
3. In relation to gender, the experts believe that there is a clear preference of micro-credit lending for women because it is known that men and women handle their economic resources differently. Also, women are mostly linked to smaller activities with lower risk (such as trade, which makes the probability of women defaulting smaller) and men are more linked to productive activities, with higher credit risk. Also, for one of the experts, micro-finance organizations are explicitly directed towards women because these institutions have the mission to support the initiatives of humble women from the popular sector in order to contribute to their empowerment and socio-economic development.
These results are not useful in discerning the existence of ethnic discrimination (due to the conflicting opinions of experts on this subject), but are extremely useful for the elicitation of a prior for gender discrimination-different from the zero-mean prior-as it is now possible to assign a priori greater preference to women during the granting of credits that analyzed the experiment. A prior of OPA = 1 was allocated to the gender binary variable (equal to one for women) and a value of ℵ = .01 was used for the precision hyper-parameters 2 3 , 5 , 5 , 6 . Higher uncertainty was allocated to ℵ due to the small number of experts consulted. The parameters for ethnicity and the interaction effects were kept at zero (no ethnic discrimination was still assumed a priori). The last column on the right of Table 8 shows that when using these priors, the preference of credit lending for women continues to be higher, but the differences between the odds ratios of indigenous and non-indigenous women disappear. The estimated parameter of ethnicity (and the interaction effects of ethnicity and gender) include an odds ratio of 1 (no effects) with a probability of 90% or higher, thus suggesting that if consultation with renowned experts is taken into account during the estimation of the mixed-effects logistic model, no evidence of ethnic discrimination is found in the results of the lab-field experiment. Credit profile of the borrower
Finally, in order to understand the nature of discrimination in the experiment (TBD or SD), two exercises with the participants were performed:
1. In the first exercise, participants were asked to sort the credit application files according to the order of review they would follow during the experiment. In this exercise, discrimination, if any, can be caused by TBD or SD: TBD can arise by an intrinsic unpleasantness of a credit officer against the file of a potential borrower, while SD can arise as a result of the short time provided to decide the review order of the applications; that is, as there was not enough information to make decisions about the applications, credit officers may have used the ethnicity/gender of the potential borrower as a proxy for the payment capacity of the applicant. Table 9 shows the number of times that a specific credit application file was preferred for revision. A higher proportion of indigenous men's applications and non-indigenous women's applications (37% and 29%, respectively) were selected first for review, compared to indigenous women (21%) and nonindigenous men (13%). It is unclear whether this selection is caused by TBD or SD, or whether being selected first for review is favorable, or unfavorable for credit lending. 2. In the second exercise, the participants were asked to sort the credit applications according to their preferences in loan disbursement for each client.
This was performed after all of the information was analyzed by the credit officers. The second exercise was designed to reduce the motivation for SD, since the participants had access and time to evaluate the complete information of the potential borrower; thus, any remaining discrimination in the sorting of files should only be related to TBD. Table 10 shows the preferences in loan disbursement for the second exercise. In this case there is a slight preference of disbursement for non-indigenous women (30%) and indigenous women (28%) over indigenous men (25%), and particularly over non-indigenous men (16%). The statistical hypothesis of no differences in these proportions can be evaluated estimating the probability of preferences in loan disbursement by gender/ethnicity using a conjugate Beta-Binomial model. Let 6 be an observed frequency with a marginal 6 that will be compared with another frequency R with R from (Beck, Behr & Madestam, 2011) . It is evident in any case that the granting decision is based on the subjective judgment of loan officers drawing from previous experience (Baklouti & Baccar, 2013) and non-quantifiable data (Wilson, 2015) , which creates room for discrimination and explains why different bank officials can reach different conclusions on the same loan proposal 5 .
In the case of the effects of ethnicity on micro credit allocation, the results are inconclusive. While some evidence of a preference on credit lending for non-indigenous women over indigenous women was found using only data evidence, no evidence of ethnic 4 The results of the experiment are also similar to those of Asiedu, Freeman and Nti-Addae (2012) , who found that black-owned and Hispanic-owned firms faced more discrimination in obtaining credit, but, in contrast, white womenowned firms did not face discrimination in terms of access to loans, and in fact paid a lower interest rate than white male-owned firms.
5 Arya et al. (2013) showed that subjective aspects as trustworthiness are important for credit scores, due to the difference between the ability to pay a debt and the willingness to pay, the latter being related to factors different from economic and financial capabilities. In terms of ethnic effects in trustworthiness, Karlan (2005) found differences in social capital and financial decisions between pairs of indigenous and non-indigenous groups, applying an experimental trust game in Ayacucho, a village of Peru. discrimination is found when consultation with renowned experts is taken into account as prior information in the mixed-effects logistic model. Thus, further research is needed to properly unravel the existence of ethnic-related discrimination. This issue is particularly relevant in Bolivia, where almost half of the total population (49%) identifies itself as indigenous or part of an ethnic community, according to the last census of Bolivia in 2012. The lack of conclusive evidence about ethnic barriers in credit access does not imply the absence of discriminatory practices in the credit market: as with other experiments, external validity is limited by the heterogeneity of the population in Bolivia, making it impossible to generalize the results to other ethnic groups who are different to the Aymara nation. Furthermore, it is possible that a social desirability bias makes the loan officers hide their true preferences about ethnic minorities. Moreover, the experiment only analyzed credit access, and it is feasible that discrimination exists in other stages of the loan allocation process; that is, discrimination may not only exist in credit rejection rates, but also in terms of predatory lending, which implies that indigenous individuals and low-income borrowers are obtaining loans at high interest rates and with unfavorable terms. Also, in developing countries like Bolivia, geographical discrimination can arise if low-income indigenous communities are disproportionately located in areas or regions that lack financial services 6 .
Since individuals without access to credit are denied the chance of self-employment and economic opportunities that are important for empowerment and for breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty (McDonnell, 2001) , it is important to keep evaluating the existence of credit discrimination. This is particularly important in the case of indigenous women with comparable credit backgrounds to that of non-indigenous women, as financial access based upon collective organization can reinforce women's vision of identity-see Lazar (2004) .
6 Structural barriers to financial inclusion may also affect credit allocation for indigenous women, (i) if the economic activity of non-indigenous female-owned firms is less capital intensive than those of indigenous female-owned firms, (ii) if the ethnicity of the credit officer affects loan approval; that is, if loan officers favor in-group over out-group members, and (iii) if indigenous females have lower financial literacy rates or experience language barriers. In Bolivia, Tassi et al. (2012) found that popular Aymara entrepreneurs developed their own strategies for trading based on their culture; that is, based on their own history and their own forms of relationship, due to the exclusion from the formal economy, the discrimination from the 'dominant bourgeoisie'-as called by Tassi et al. (2012) -and their limited social mobility.
